Thursday, October 27, 2016

How CISOs Are Really Measured

Modern CISOs have one of the toughest, most stressful jobs in the world. There are far more risks to businesses today, then there were ten years ago, and many of these new and evolving risks come from the cyber world. Business risks used to be largely limited to competitors taking over portions of the market, failure to deliver on expectations of customers, or rising operating costs; things a business can control. Today however, there are adversaries who are actively trying to disrupt and break business for their personal gain. As we've seen in countless examples, a breach or a successful disruptive attack by a malicious actor or group can cause financial damages to the impacted organization in the ranges of millions to tens of millions of dollars. There are also some nation states who actively infiltrate organizations, steal intellectual property, and disseminate it to growing businesses within their nation, creating international competition or potentially locking international businesses out of global regions. Additionally, as news of cybersecurity issues has now become mainstream, general awareness among both consumers and providers has grown. Assumptions of data security are being replaced with fears of personal or corporate damages followed by regulatory controls and mandates, which means effective cybersecurity practices among providers have become not only a competitive advantage but also a requirement to do business. It's on everyone's mind, and must be addressed.

A single successful cyber incident can put a corporation out of business, whether that be through loss in customers caused by a loss of their trust and willingness to do continued business, through the inability to operate due to a disruptive attack, through being denied access to industry as a result of non-compliance with regulatory standards, or through financial damages sustained by an organization through the remediation and post-incident activity. This is the weight on the CISO's shoulders; the viability and longevity of the business. Product teams have to produce awesome products. Marketing teams have to reach customers effectively. Human Resource teams have to ensure the right talent is attracted, hired, performs, and is retained. CISOs have to protect the business and enable it to function.

In addition to the pressure of potential damages and negative business impact, the CISO also has to manage the fact that the cybersecurity industry is constantly changing. That means they have to be constantly learning, and refreshing technology, process, and people. Adversaries are constantly refining their trade craft to find new ways to break into maturing defenses, and the entry into the criminal underground is becoming easier and easier. The rise of successful threat activity has attracted more and more criminals and has resulted in the monetization of the development, distribution, and use of tools and processes used to perpetrate cyber intrusions. There are now criminals who no longer hack, but instead make their living developing and renting access to tools that others can use to hack. The better they can make their tools, the more customers they will have. In addition, regulatory controls and customer expectations continue to change, forcing CISOs to have to continually develop and implement new controls to satisfy these expectations, so that the company can simply do business. The entire CISO world is in a constant state of change, and the information security program must keep up. This is unique from almost every other industry where it's common for problems, materials, costs, processes etc. to remain static for decades at a time. High-tech and health fields are unique in this way.

So not only does the CISO have to keep data safe to protect the business, they have to also actively thwart the adversary which is continuously growing in numbers and sophistication, but they also have to continually adapt to the shifting demands of customers and industry. They have to execute well, learn how to execute differently (just after they finished), and manage the transformation from what was effective yesterday, to what is needed to be effective tomorrow. Ready to apply?

Given this, we might assume that the CISOs measurement of success is in ensuring security incidents do not happen. We might naturally think that the CISOs annual performance goal says "make sure there is no breach," and at their annual performance review, the CEO looks at the news headlines and if their company name wasn't listed for a security related issue, then the CISO get's his bonus. We would like to think that the Information Security organization led by a CISO is there as sort of the protector and guardian of data, preventing massive losses that could come from data breaches, brand damaging events, or disruptions to service delivery. Well, we are, sort of. However, preventing losses isn't really what CISOs and their support organizations are measured by. Yeah, really. Why? Well first because you can't measure that, and second because that's not a return on investment. 0 breaches means equalization and investors aren't interested in keeping the status quo. A CISO can't prove success simply bad things didn't happen, nor is it sufficient for a CISO claim success based on the number of attacks thwarted. Those two indicators of doing security well don't translate to what CEOs and investors care about. What CISOs are measured by, is how effectively they contributed to revenue and profit generation. Unfortunately, this usually means CISOs are primarily incentivized to do something other than the things security practitioners are most passionate about. At least not for the reasons they are passionate.

The hard reality is, a CISO will have to say "no" to implementing optimal data protection, if doing so negatively impacts revenue or profit in a measurable way. They have to. Their mission is data protection to drive revenue and profit generation.

If you are a security practitioner, I'm sure you can relate to a time where you defined, selected, or had the opportunity to implement some new security capability or product, only to learn that you can't enable or leverage all the cool features that you know will keep data safe. Right? The CISO was probably the one who brought you that bad news (or it trickled down via your manager). You probably assumed that they just didn't understand the problem or the tool, and that they were simply making a "bad" decision to stretch the limited budget available to them. You probably thought they were being shrewd and that the business leaders just don't understand information security.  Well...maybe that is the case. More likely however, your CISO made a calculated decision to leverage this opportunity to improve their value to the business. CISOs don't usually sit back and say "yeah, I know we could completely mitigate that risk, but I just don't want to." They think, "if I spend those resources there, on that issue, which could potentially have that minor impact, if these certain things happen, then I can't use those resources over here for that other thing that could help the x product team unlock that new customer sector." That's more likely what's going through their head.

They aren't saying "no," as much as they are saying "if I do that, then I can't do this, which is more important to the business." Security practitioners like to be purists and claim it's all about the data protection mission. The reality is, it's all about the business, otherwise none of us would have jobs, and the CISO is part of the business leadership (or should be).

You see, the CISO role is revenue AND profit generating in many cases. Getting products into customers hands generates revenue. Profit comes from the margin between revenue and cost. However, CISOs aren't just about cutting costs to maximize revenue and they aren't just a lever to compress operating costs. This is where many business leaders and investors get it wrong too. Businesses identify opportunities for growth based on complex calculations, and they define their business strategy according to where and how they believe they can win business, generate, and grow revenue. As one example, I recently learned that a CEO was evaluating two different classes of potential clients; small and medium businesses, and enterprises. The potential revenue to be captured vs. the cost of winning the potential business caused the CEO to choose one class of customers, and to intentionally exclude from business strategy the other. However, in order to reach that chosen segment that the business growth strategy was dependent upon, the company must show compliance with regulatory standards and customer expectations for information security. In order to secure the profit promised to investors who are backing the business, those new customers have to be engaged in the right way and within a certain operating cost or ratio of cost to revenue. That means in order for the business strategy to be effective, the CISO now has to build an information security program that is effective, is compliant, and doesn't exceed operating cost goals. If the CISO fails, revenue and/or profit goals will not be realized. In this sense, they are enabling AND protecting revenue and profit expectations.

You see the business can't even engage the potential customers until the CISO can ensure the information security program satisfies regulatory compliance. That means revenue is unattainable without the CISO. Further, customers won't sign the deal until they have an assurance that the information security program meets their expectations and is effective. That means revenue won't start without the CISO. Additionally, revenue sustainment for that customer or sector is dependent upon the continued performance of the information security program (no breaches and adaptive to changing customer requirements). That means if the CISO fails, revenue will be lost or growth opportunities will be missed. Finally, if the information security program doesn't remain cost effective, profit goals cannot be reached. The more effective and efficient the information security program, the more revenue is possible, and the wider the profit margin can be.

That means the company's overall revenue and profit goals are dependent upon the CISO, which is a shared responsibility among all the executive staff. The idea that the information security program is simply a cost to do business that must be controlled, represents a mindset that doesn't understand how this works.

Let's say a customer comes to a business and says, "we would buy your product if it did x." Your product team would consider development of that capability, a revenue generating act because doing so captured that business. Product and sales teams are viewed generally as revenue generating. If the customer also says, "and we won't buy your product unless you can ensure the data we give you is secure." That becomes a requirement that the information security team must deliver along with the product in order to win the deal. It's no different than a customer saying "I want feature x from your product." They want your product to include functionality and security. Perhaps the security they seek isn't within the product itself, but rather within the realm of the customer to provider relationship. Either way, it's a customer requirement that must be met in order to capture the revenue that comes from the deal, and it's a requirement that must be sustained to maintain the customer relationship in good standing, just as continuous service delivery is.

I can tell you dozens of stories of business to business or consumer to business relationships that were dependent upon the success and confidence of the information security program. I'll tell you right now that if customers lose trust in a product or company for security reasons, revenue and profit will fall. That means effectively establishing and actively maintaining that trust, causes revenue and profit to rise.

Some may argue that information security is just part of the company operating costs just as IT, HR, Legal, and other internal functions. I disagree. I think it was that way a decade ago, but IT, HR, Legal, and other internal functions are not direct requirements from customers; information security has become so. Customers don't often send specific requirements or validation requests to other internal function teams, and regulatory compliance mandates don't usually call out those functions.

So, when it comes to the senior leadership of a company, including the investors and board of directors, the value of the CISO really comes down to whether or not their actions enabled and contributed to revenue and profit. If not, then the program and the person suffer. If so, then the program and the person are rewarded. What specific questions can executives measure CISOs by or what can CISOs use to prove success:

How many customer sales did the CISO directly interact with to help capture?

How many customer sales were won as a result of the information security program? Conversely, how many sales or customers were lost due to problems with the information security program?

Did the information security program successfully remove barriers to enter or maintain market and customer engagement?

Did the information security program operate in a cost effective manner so as to not disrupt the expected revenue and profit goals while securing existing and new business?

Did the CISO effectively lead the business through a security issue that resolved without great loss?

If the executive leadership or board can honestly say, "CISO, because of your efforts, we were able to access sector A, and capture customer Z, and you did so while maintaining a cost effective program," then the CISO has won. If the leadership team says, "CISO, you did a good job keeping costs down which helped us meet financial goals," well that's good too, but a CISO is more valuable than that. If the executive team says, "CISO, you kept us out of the news," well...that's good, but it's also bad, because someone could easily argue that the lack of attackers or attacker interest kept the company out of the news.

The true business value of the CISO can be found in how they directly enable, capture, sustain, and protect revenue and profit. Information security is no longer just a cost to do business and if your CISO can't demonstrate otherwise, then they may not be the right one for your company.

Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Should You Build a SOC?

There is a section of consultants and educators in the cybersecurity industry, who proclaim that the litmus test for having a mature information security program is revealed by the presence and maturity of a dedicated, in-house Security Operations Center. Their message says, that if you have a SOC, you have arrived. You are doing it right. You are the mature security organization. That has many others wondering, "is it time for us to move in that direction and obtain that level of program maturity?"

I've been there, done that. I worked in an MSSP for over a decade, whose SOC was world-class and served as that model for our customers, partners, and other interested parties. We also provided SOC build and maturity consulting services to help organizations reach what we had attained. We were an early SOC and had the luxury of maturing ahead of the industry to truly lead the way. We went through several significant periods of re-design (in form and function) as the threat landscape and technology scene changed. We also had the opportunity to replicate our work several times, which forced us to review end-to-end what it was we were doing, why, and what should change. I was one of those consultant, education, practitioners who carried that message of maturity forward into the industry. I have also since been part of two organizations, who didn't have a SOC but were considering building them. In fact, one of those two organizations claimed they did have a SOC, called themselves a SOC, and even used email aliases with the term "soc" in them, but when I arrived, it turned out they didn't have any of the fundamentals (except the email address) that represent a SOC. They didn't even have a room. The security organization recognized the value, but didn't know how to actually build or operate. Hence my mission when I joined. The organization I'm currently at is considering this question as well. Is it the right time in our story to make the investment and step up the CMMI ladder to the next level?

If you are considering the question of building a SOC today, in 2016 or beyond, please keep reading. I may have some surprises in store for you.

The premise behind the modern Security Operations Center, or SOC, is to enable common awareness of the security state of the enterprise, with ample staff ready and trained, supported by carefully instrumented technology and defined processes, to ensure you can pounce on the right security issues that arise with consistency and expediency. SOCs represent the embodiment of a full and mature implementation of the NIST 800-61 standard; a center of excellence purposely built to enable full incident response lifecycle management in an intentional way, tailored to the organization in which they live. SOC staffing models seek to maintain sufficient staff that can handle numerous incidents at the same time based on the expectation that numerous incidents will happen on a daily basis. Staffing models are also designed to ensure teams can sift through the massive volume of data SOC's consume, to effectively triage and identify the issues that require action. As a security leader with a SOC, you will know that no matter the volume of security issues, nor the specific person on shift to handle them, you have a place to effectively coordinate and manage incident response in a consistent and professional manner. Your people will be aware, accessible, and equipped. You can have the cyber equivalent of NASA's mission control center. You can walk into a room, and have immediate situational awareness regarding your organization's cybersecurity posture.

The Operations Center mindset isn't new or unique to cybersecurity, and in theory it does make a lot of sense to have that single point of awareness, visibility, and coordination, especially given the risks facing organizations today. Additionally, more and more organizations expect high standards from their IT teams, and what better way to ensure quality, than with highly defined processes, commonly trained staff, and reinforced physical and logical structure? It works for call centers right? That all sounds great, doesn't it? Realistically though, what does it take to build a SOC, and can you do it yourself?

The reality is, if you are an organization who has decided the full mature SOC model is something you'd like to implement and operate, then you don't have one today. That means your existing team wasn't able to or chose not to operate in that highly structured manner. In my experience, that's most likely because they haven't seen it before, haven't been resourced accordingly, or don't agree it's for them (doesn't match their or their company culture). Regardless of the reason, they aren't operating in that SOC paradigm, and in my experience, they won't be able to build it for you. There are two primary challenges facing them; the day-to-day work that they already have to do, and the practical knowledge that they need to guide their actions from their current operating state into that final SOC model you desire. Quite simply; they won't be able to build the roadmap and won't be able to execute against it. They are busy, and won't know how to build the SOC. You will need help. You'll need a dedicated team who has the experience of both building and operating within a SOC because it's a complete mindset shift, it takes a ton of work, and unless you've lived the value, you won't appreciate it and a lot of what it takes to build a SOC may not make sense up front. The SOC build journey is extremely expensive, and it takes a lot of time. At least one year.

Hire any of the big consulting firms with the mission to build you a mature security operations program, and they will ship you a small army of experienced consultants wrapped in a nicely structured package with a 1 year roadmap to deliver said capability. This build team will run in parallel with your current team, and may engage/partner with your existing staff depending upon the maturity of what you already have. The team of consultants will probably contain one person focused on building out your technology layer, predominantly your log and event analysis capability. Another will be focused on developing use cases for threat detection, and the processes and playbooks that define how to leverage the technology and what to do when an alert is triggered. Another consultant will be focused on the people story, finding you the right talent, building a staffing plan, training plan, retention policy etc. Finally, you'll have a PM as your go-to person who will orchestrate this madness in a very structured manner to build this new function for you. It will be great, and expensive. You see, it takes a dedicated team a long time to build a fully operationalized and mature security operations practice. I know because I've lived it.

However, is that feasible, realistic, or even relevant to the majority of InfoSec programs and their parent organizations today? Having been there and done that, I can tell you with confidence that you probably don't need that highly structured, mature SOC that sounds so appealing. Yes, the message I now share to the industry has changed, because times have changed. Let's take a look at some of the primary selling points of having that fully developed and mature Security Operations Center:

  • Centralized (and physical) orchestration of all things InfoSec, namely communication, monitoring, and incident response coordination
  • A room that facilitates common and continuous awareness of the state of security for the monitored organization, staffed with personnel who are ready and quick to respond to security issues
  • Around the clock, 24x7x365 staff performing active monitoring, ready to detect and manage any issue that should arise
  • Highly structured processes and procedures that enable consistency and efficiency in service delivery to the organization
  • Specifically configured technology that supports visibility, awareness, and execution
  • Accountability and validation that Analysts are doing what they need to
  • Rapid and personal communication among InfoSec, and namely Operations staff to facilitate detection, analysis, and response actions
  • Dedicated facilities built and secured for use by the Security team
  • Controlled access, separating sensitive information from the common employee community or from visitors
In a sentence, the SOC represents a place of focus; a place where a team can assemble with all the right equipment, to perform a function in a consistent and coordinated manner. But, do you need a room for that, do you still need the same equipment, and do you need to invest in the level of effort to ensure that highly automated and repeatable experience? How many times will your staff need to coordinate together to deliver that same repeatable experience?

Having staff at the ready, armed with the tools and processes to manage that alert as soon as it pops sounds great right? The assumption behind the modern SOC is that you need those resources at the ready, because you are under constant attack by sophisticated adversaries who can bypass your controls and will break in. You need the SOC so that you can rapidly detect these problems and act to mitigate them before they become a major issue. In fact you'll still hear the terms "worm" and "outbreak" used in SOC circles because that's the old school world and problem statement SOC's were created to solve; rapidly stopping the expansion of a threat before it could reach catastrophic levels. To do that, the story says you need 24x7x365 and tons of data to correlate into actionable events, plus awesome dashboards that track trends and status, plus flashing lights that "sound" the alarm when something interesting happens, followed by automated orchestration that creates tickets for Analysts, pre-populated with data elements gathered from multiple different sources to enrich the ticket with attributes that will help answer questions on your Analysts's minds. It's all about speed; you have to out-pace the attacker. If you are really good, you might even have pre-selected and presented playbooks or IR actions ready for your Analysts to use. Then, your team springs into action, performing initial triage, coordinating next-steps, performing an initial assessment, carving out action items...and away they go racing through the incident response lifecycle while their adversary on the other end of the globe races through the kill chain to reach their objectives before they can be cut off.

That's the way it works right? We still race attackers and worms through our networks right? This is a live game of cat and mouse isn't it? Well, let's talk about that.

I haven't seen a worm or virus outbreak in years. The closest example might be a phishing campaign or targeted attack that spreads select malware across multiple assets within an environment, but those are few and very far between. It turns out that most malware we face on a daily basis is highly automated and well known in terms of identifiable characteristics. The data points you actually need to look for to validate a malware infection from a detection and data analysis perspective, are actually few and easy to find. Attacks are also highly automated and usually set into motion without direct supervision by the operators. That's not always the case, but I'm speaking to an 80/20 split (80% of the time vs. the 20% of exceptions to the rule). Pick your malware and delivery methodology. Pick your modern campaign. What your Ops team will encounter on a daily basis is most likely crimeware, delivered through broad and not necessarily targeted phishing campaigns where you are one of many. Your employees may receive emails with malicious attachments or URLs, or they may stumble upon a web exploit kit after having been re-directed from their favorite news website that happened to be poisoned with malvertising. Phishing campaigns (by far the most common threat or attack we experience today), are a constant wave. 50-100 malicious emails a day is a likely number, but with modern technology, only the first 1-5 will actually get through. The eventual malware that drops (if the attack is successful) will automatically begin performing it's defined functions, which often includes local system profiling, immediate data theft, and check-ins with it's command and control server for further instructions. Many of these malware infections, after immediately posting the data they were designed to initially steal, then sit, waiting for future instructions from their master, which may come days, weeks, or months later.

The most popular malware experience of 2016, crypto/ransomware, performs it's damage immediately upon infection. There is no race. Once installed, it's game over, and the last time I checked, crytpoware doesn't have worm-like properties. The race, is actually one of prevention in the first place, but I'm getting ahead of myself. Let's first look at the infection race.

What is the average time from infection to action by an adversary? Before you can decide on the resources and overall success criteria for your SOC, you need to understand the adversary you are up against and how they operate. If you plan to equip yourself to win the detection and remediation race, you better understand how fast you need to be able to go. In a recent investigation I completed, an adversary, having successfully brute forced their way into a server where they created a local account with admin privileges, left the compromised server untouched for weeks. They attacked, established their foothold, then left. When they came back, they simply did so to validate their access and to install a few preferred user tools (including the FireFox web browser). They went silent again for a period of time, and came back about a month later to install more tools. That race was minimally weeks, if not months long and the actual impact was nothing short of an annoyance.

This follows another incident I investigated about 2 years ago where an adversary compromised a publicly facing web server through a true 0-day, dropped a local web shell, used it to enumerate and understand the files on the target system, then left it alone for 6 months until we found it. Sure, they exploited a server and gained root access, but they were apparently staging themselves for a later action. Again, I'm speaking to the 80/20 rule here.

In another recent example that shows the variations on the attacker race, I helped investigate an incident where an AWS console admin API key was accidentally published to a public GitHub repository. It was there for a while before an adversary noticed it. When they acted with that information, they did so very quickly. They used it to quickly spin up a bit coin mining operation in unauthorized AWS resources. The damage to the business? None really.

Your ready-to-go SOC team will likely be able to detect the stages of infection, and will likely be instrumented (due to the general noise and low liklihood of requiring action) to monitor for indicators of compromise. At best, they will be able to respond to validate and perform some level of mitigation within hours. That means they may be able to prevent that infected system from being used for further outcomes down the road, but it's unlikely that they will be able to prevent the initial data theft (browser information or locally stored data), nor will they be able to prevent cryptomalware from taking it's effect. In the true 0 day example where the adversary was active from the moment of installation, by the time they completed their enumeration of local data and potential extraction,  a well defined SOC team would still be in the initial triage phase. You see the automated attack will always beat the reactive SOC, and the manual attack (on average) likely doesn't require mitigation within a few can probably wait. However, if the malware or methods your adversary is using is that easily identifiable to enable, and if the infection context is so easy to validate that you believe you have a fighting change, then why didn't you automate prevention in the first place?

Ah, there's the root question and that question flies in the face of the traditional SOC argument. Does automated threat prevention work, and if so, what does that mean to the modern SOC built to chase IOCs and handle multiple intrusions at the same time? Conventional wisdom in the industry says, no, prevention doesn't work. We tried back in 2000. Conventional wisdom says you will be infiltrated and you can't prevent it from happening. That's true of a small number of potential scenarios; true 0 days where you were targeted, or true crafted infiltrations by a nation state who developed tactics unique to you. Or true for the first wave of phishing emails that come from a new campaign. However, for the mass majority of issues your operations team and organization are likely to face, I say yes, they can be prevented. Relatively easily. At least that has been my recent experience.

This especially proved itself over the past year at my present place of employment where we embrace the prevention story 100%, where sandboxing is king, and where we actively build what we know back into our products to enable prevention next time, not just detection. In our world, that incident situation that led to manual remediation efforts, becomes not the basis for a new SIEM detection use case, but rather a candidate for research and prevention in our core inspection technology. If we missed it, then we treat that as a bug in our prevention stack, and work to fix that. It's built into everything we do; prevention works, prevention first. If you can define it, you can prevent it. It's actually quite simple when you leverage the right tools.

When I first joined my present company, I didn't believe the prevention story. I thought it was interesting, and had potential, but I didn't believe it. I pulled in my extensive list of IOCs that had been experienced by myself or others, pulled all our relevant logs into one massive searchable repository, wrote out my top 50 threat scenarios including the data attributes and analysis logic that supported them, and went to work hunting for all the infections I thought I should find. My prior years of experience led me to assume that we should expect to handle about 5-10 endpoint infections per day. We were seeing about 1 per week. As I started drilling into my logs, I quickly identified what I expected to find; emails containing suspicious attachments and URLs, web browsing sessions that looked strange, funky DNS requests from internal hosts, endpoints making connections to known malicious websites, active content and files being downloaded by employees that were marked as suspicious, outbound connections to IPs on known C2 lists etc. All of these were indicators of attack, some of potential compromise. Then, as I continued my investigation methods, looking for attributes from the endpoints that would validate impact, well, I found...nothing. This continued for weeks, and aside from the 1-2 positive threats found per week (which all turned out to be greyware), my assumptions about prevention not working were shattered. That darn sandbox. Worse, I was hard at work also creating processes and playbooks, assuming we needed highly defined structure to ensure repetition and efficiency in IR. I was gearing up for a dozen infections a day. I found on average, 1-2 per week.

You see we do two fundamental things right. First, every file retrieved or delivered from the Internet, we analyze offline via static and dynamic sandbox technology that also compares characteristics (file identifiers as well as behaviors) with other known threats. When the verdict comes back that the file is malicious, our technology prevents the download or delivery, or prevents the local execution on the endpoint. Second, we don't just focus on the installation phase of the kill chain, but took it up one notch and also identify and prevent signs of exposure to exploit code or sites that behaved like web exploit kits. For email, we proactively analyze links delivered to employees and update our prevention tools behind the scenes based on our conclusions of that analysis so by the time the employee could click, we had dynamically updated our block list and prevented access. We inspect everything that could lead to an infection.

It actually works. Better yet, we log a lot of detail along the way, providing Analysts visibility into the sequence of events we detect leading up to the prevention decisions. However, as I was coming to the realizing that prevention actually does work, investigating these various triggers and alerts kept me in a logic loop. Here's a few examples.

Let's say an employee browsed to a suspicious website that was allowed by policy for some reason. While there, they were redirected to a website that contained a malicious ad that redirected the browser to a web exploit kit. Great, that's a candidate for a further look from an event analysis perspective. We have plenty of solutions from industry that can identify web exploit kit behavior as it happens. In fact, there are open source solutions and rules that enable you to do that. But better yet, we just sandbox everything anyway. The obvious next question in the WEK investigation process is, "was the endpoint then served a file?" If yes, then we would need to analyze it to determine if it's malicious. If it didn't, then we would need to monitor the endpoint for new activity out of the normal. What do you as an Analyst do to validate that? You try to re-create the exploit experience or try to grab a copy of any files that were transferred to the exposed endpoint, then you'll probably send them through a sandbox or up to VirusTotal etc. for analysis to find out if it's malicious or not. Here's the deal, our network sandbox technology automatically grabs a copy of every downloaded or served file and runs it for further analysis, automating the validation and prevention process. The very work I as an Analyst was preparing to do, our technology already did. At the same time, our endpoint protection technology, monitors every process that attempts to execute locally, also sending it up to the sandbox for further analysis. So...why not just focus my efforts on monitoring the results of the sandbox analysis since that's what I need in the end - some validation that a malicious process was delivered or is running? Well because if our sandbox can detect it, it would have, and our control technology would have prevented it based on that sandbox verdict. See my logic loop?

In another example, let's say an employee receives an email that has a malicious URL, and my technology detects that, but still delivers the email because it took some time to analyze the site or because policy allowed it for some other reason. The employee might click right? Well maybe, but once the verdict on the URL is decided, the technology automatically implements a block or permit decision. What if the URL used some sort of cloaking technology to evade sandboxing and the verdict is returned as "benign" or "unknown" so we don't prevent the employee's click? Well, fine, if the website serves a malicious file to the browser as a result of the click, my network stack will grab that file and send it off to the sandbox for analysis. What if that failed? Then I would traditionally look for signs that a file or process was dropped on the endpoint, or that some suspicious new traffic or behavior was observed from the endpoint following the URL exposure. Oh, but my endpoint solution is already monitoring all local processes and sandboxing them as well.

See where this is going? We sandbox potential weaponized items like URLs and files on their way in. Then we sandbox any content that transits our perimeter. Then we sandbox every process that attempts to execute on endpoints. That's delivery, exploit, and installation prevention. Better yet, it's not IOC dependent because we perform unique analysis every time.

In another example, let's say I'm looking for IOCs on the network - specifically at network communications that resemble known threats. If I find some, I'll need to get access to the endpoint, find the offending process, and analyze or validate it in my sandbox right? Well, it turns out that since my endpoint solution continuously monitors all new processes as they start, and performs analysis on-the-fly including submitting the process for sandbox analysis. It also looks at the local actions performed by the process to determine how closely those resemble malicious actions to help influence the prevention decision. So I don't need to look for IOCs on my network, because I'm constantly monitoring every process that tries to run on an endpoint...and if it looks malicious, I'm preventing it from executing.

Ok, so what about an exposed web server that has a publicly facing form and a data input validation vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to upload a file which is remotely activated through a crafted URL? Well, my network appliance is going to send of copy of that uploaded file to the sandbox for analysis, while the endpoint solution is going to monitor local execution for signs of malicious activity. Done.

See my point? The sandbox and endpoint solutions that are now available have actually changed the game. Quite effectively. If you are preventing the adversary from delivering their weapons and preventing the weapons from running, then you can significantly reduce the number of investigations and incidents in your environment, thus eliminating the race condition your SOC is gearing up to win. You can defeat the adversary before they even have a chance.

So what does that multi-million dollar SOC with all it's IOC detections and correlation capabilities and workflow automations do now? It idles.

You might ask, "well what about DDoS, malware-less intrusions, and insider threats?" Yep, those are still a concern...but enough to warrant 24x7x365 SOCs? DDoS is solved for via off-premise solutions like Akamai (Prolexic) and others. Malware-less intrusions and insiders are still a concern, but again, thinking of the actual value in rapid detection and response, does it actually gain you much? Anything? I'm not convinced it does. It takes a lot for me to say that because 6 years ago you would have found me in my employers RSA Conference vendor booth, selling customers on the rapid detection and response story, touting our time to detect and accuracy of detection capabilities. As of today, I'm just not seeing the value anymore.

Granted, there are still several other security scenarios that may come into your experience.

What about employees who accidentally post sensitive information on the Internet? Yeah that's a problem that must be mitigated, but you aren't going to detect that with data feeds and SIEMs (at least you don't need that level of complexity for that detection).

What about employees who bring in their own infected laptops and plug them into the corporate network? Ok, well we still prevent known C2 calls (again, based on our own analysis of malware we've seen plus all the malware samples our product vendor has seen). Even still, what are the odds that the adversary would be attempting to remotely control that device while it's present on your network? Probably not going to happen.

What about stolen property (laptops, servers, tablets, smartphones etc.)? Yeah, that's still an issue, but you don't detect stolen property with your SOC. You might respond to reports of stolen property, in which case you'll simply file a police report, assess potential damages, and try to perform a remote wipe of the device or data if you have an MDM solution.

You see, my point is, I believe the security industry has actually solved the primary problem so effectively that the SOCs of yesterday no longer apply. The SOC concept was designed to enable defenders to detect and respond to intrusions faster than the adversary could operate to leverage them. However, today, we can simply eliminate the intrusions rather than build compensating processes around them. Rather than putting millions of dollars into that SOC gear, put millions of dollars into prevention through solutions provided like those from Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, or others focused on the prevention story end-to-end. My experience is, your Ops team will have few and far incidents to manage, which nullifies the value statement of that SOC room. You don't need central comms; you can have central ticketing and chat for rapid engagement when needed. You don't need a room to facilitate common awareness because dashboards are presented by applications, and applications can be securely accessed remotely. You don't need to rapidly respond to issues because in all likelihood, you those actors who are that sophisticated that you couldn't prevent them, are going to out pace and out wit you anyway. You won't need highly structured and repeatable processes for a team of Analysts to use, because your incident count will be so few and far between, it's not worth the ROI or resources to build all that pre-planning. You can wing-it each time with the right seasoned people. Finally, you don't need that structure, because having a physical room to operate in 1) wastes corporate real-estate, and 2) limits you to the talent readily available in your immediate area. In this industry, where we have 0% unemployment and virtual connectedness through solutions like Zoom, chat, and others, placing physical boundaries around your security team simply hinders your ability to capture and retain the talent you need to be successful.

Still convinced you need a SOC? I'm not, and again, that's saying a lot given that 13 years of my career was dependent upon selling SOC services.

Monday, October 24, 2016

Embarrassing Emails - Can We Secure This?

I was recently asked to provide some thoughts on the subject of the unauthorized access and disclosure of personal email used by national leaders. Specifically referring to the email issues surrounding Hilary Clinton, Colin Powell, and John Podesta, I was asked the following:

  • How did this happen in a world where security issues are so well known?
  • Can we secure personal email to prevent this sort of thing from happening in the future?
  • Do consumer email providers, like Google, provide sufficient access controls and account security?
  • Is this an education problem and do we need to increase email security awareness?
  • Is there a way to keep humans from falling victim to phishing attacks?
  • Why would someone like these high profile individuals intentionally ignore security capabilities generally and easily available to them?
  • Why didn't they use authorized communication (email) channels?
  • Are these people not aware of modern threats like phishing and social engineering?
My short answer is, there is no excuse for this. In my opinion, these email leaks represent the consequence of poor judgement and lack of integrity by the individual whose account was exposed.

You see, the problem isn't technology. The simple answer to the email security question is, yes, these people should have known better and they did have viable security options available to them to protect them from these outcomes. Viable and effective security controls do exist that can prevent this. The core problem is the fact that these individuals decided for their own personal ambitions, to bypass the controls and boundaries provided to them in the forms of propriety, policy, and technology, to do what they wanted to do in spite of the risks they were well aware of. That's called selfishness. Additionally, they chose to record controversial, sometimes vulgar, and potentially illegal thoughts and actions in writing. When exposed, that embarrassed them and revealed their true character and thoughts. That's an integrity and character issue. You can't fix that with technology. We have social boundaries and morality to help guide our public expressions. We have tools of accountability to help enforce integrity. If you choose to bypass those boundaries and extend your private thoughts and actions into the public realm via a means like consumer email, you are destined to have those private thoughts exposed. If your private thoughts and actions are immoral, illegal, or otherwise questionable, then when exposed you will be embarrassed as will those you have implicated in your communications. The issue with electronic communications is, once you send a message, you can't take it back and you lose control over where it goes and who has access to it. I can provide you with all the safety features you need, but if you choose to not leverage them, and intentionally take on the risk of what will happen without them, then what happens next is on you, not me. So it is with email security. 

The core problem is one of morality, submission, integrity, humility, and honestly, selfishness. What we saw from Clinton, Powell, and Podesta is a decision that they wanted to do what they wanted to do, how they wanted to do it, despite the boundaries (legal, moral, and protective) provided to them. That's arrogance and selfishness. They felt getting their thoughts communicated to facilitate their actions was more important than the controls they violated. I encounter this on a daily basis in my job. Employees who don't like the security policies and controls implemented to keep them and the company safe, look for ways to bypass security to get things done that they want, or to use things that they prefer over what has been provided to them. This is an issue of pride, integrity, and submission. Everyone has personal preferences. Everyone has their own way of going about things. However, when we come together as a group or community or nation for a collective objective, we must establish structure around how we will operate together, and we must all set our personal preferences aside to be successful. I'm not pitching socialism here. I'm simply saying that there are times, especially when we form as a unit to accomplish some goal, where we must set our personal preferences aside for the sake of the unit and the outcomes we seek. This is especially true for public figures who are directly involved in policy making and governance for our nation. Those individuals need to learn to respect the office they represent, and the people they will impact by their actions.

If you are part of corporation or formal organization, you must adhere to the policies and standards defined by that corporate body. To do otherwise is immoral. If you are part of society, you must adhere to the social norms and laws established by that society, otherwise society won't work. It's clear from what has been exposed in these leaked emails, that these individuals, Clinton, Powell, and Podesta, had their personal gain in mind above everything else. They went rogue, and selfishly so.

As far as security awareness is concerned, again, I believe there is no excuse for these individuals. Clinton and Powell have served in various capacities at the highest levels of national security within our government. There is no possible way that they were kept isolated for decades from the concern of information leakage. Powell, as a General in the US Army, would be well aware of the need for operational security (OPSEC), and establishing governing frameworks to ensure mission protection (including communication security). The cybersecurity story has been in national headlines for over a decade. If these individuals were unaware of the email security issue, then they are unfit to lead a nation. The Department of State has an information security program. Once upon a time, I supported it directly. It would be nearly impossible and very intentionally for the head of a federal agency to be unaware of the security issues and risks that agency faced. Especially cyber today. Especially following the major DHS breach of a few years ago. Presidents Bush and Obama signed executive orders regarding cybersecurity, and major threat monitoring consolidation among government agencies occurred while Powell and Clinton were engaged in their formal roles. As the spouse of a former President, Clinton should be well aware of the risks of working beyond the boundaries established, and the potential ramifications of "leaks." There is simply no excuse for these individuals.

So, what about the technical aspect, and what can people use that is effective?

When it comes to email security, there are a few very simple and effective solutions available to you. The first is Multi-Factor Authentication or MFA. Many banks offer MFA as a standard for online banking, as do email providers. MFA simply means more than one type of authentication method - something like a password plus a single use code - is used to access your account. The simplest example of this is when your provider sends you an authentication code via text or email when you attempt to access your account. Using MFA means only the person who has both your password and your device which receives the MFA code (like your cell phone) can access your account. For the most part, hackers can't get beyond MFA if you use it correctly.

However, it is also important, even with MFA, that you operate with caution and diligence with regard to your account information. Passwords you use should still be complex, and should differ from site to site as much as possible (even minor variations can help especially when used in conjunction with MFA). Take care to also restrain from publishing personal information that might be used to gain access to your accounts via other means. Finally, take care with regard to your browsing habits to help make sure the devices you use to receive your MFA tokens are secure and clean.

Additionally, there are solutions that can monitor and analyze email messages you receive to identify harmful messages that may be used to install malware on your computer. The most effective technology we have today to provide this level of security, is dynamic sandboxing analysis. Using this method, any file or link you receive via email is analyzed offline by the technology to determine if it performs malicious actions when accessed. Sandboxing is highly effective at threat detection and prevention when used correctly. Malware, once installed, can be used to perform many functions, including stealing your passwords, or directly monitoring your keyboard entries. This can lead to unauthorized account access without you knowing, if you aren't using secondary controls like MFA. Solutions that detect and prevent malicious email are widely available, but are usually adopted by companies or organizations due to their expense. Effective solutions are provided by security vendors Palo Alto Networks, ProofPoint, FireEye, CrowdStrike, Fortinet, McAfee, and others. This is why using sanctioned email systems on approved provider networks is the best idea for official email security.

There are also solutions out there that can monitor and analyze websites both proactively, and reactively, to determine if any malicious content or code exists on the web page that might compromise your computer or information. Once analyzed, these vendors categorize the website based on the content served, risk of exposure, and if malicious attributes are present. These reputation lists are widely shared and re-used among the information security industry providing a wide range of known and analyzed websites. You can leverage these lists to protect yourself from landing on unintentional or malicious sites. There are numerous tactics used by adversaries to also spoof websites that you think might be legitimate, or to poison legitimate websites with malicious code that can lead to malware being installed on your computer. For consumers, Google provides some website validation and checking services in their browsers (Safe Browsing), but more robust website analysis solutions are available via some of the same providers I mentioned before, as well as by consumer focused products like Symantec, McAfee, Sophos, Trend Micro, Microsoft, and others.

Finally there are many endpoint security solutions out there, often referred to via their legacy name as Anti-Virus, that monitor your computer for the presence of malware. They are designed to keep your system clean so that information cannot be stollen from it. Modern versions are referred to as endpoint protection solutions. These solutions are highly effective, especially when used in conjunction with most if not all of the above. In fact, you can make the argument that a highly effective endpoint protection solution, nullifies some of the upper level inspection and protection technologies (network based) that I mentioned above. After all, if you can prevent malware from installing on your endpoint, then it doesn't really matter if you received it or were exposed to it to begin with.

What endpoint and network inspection technologies do not provide for you, is security against people using legitimate data to access legitimate accounts in legitimate ways. What I mean by that is, if I'm not using some secondary validation method (like a single-use code), Google can't tell if it's me using my password to login to my email account via gmail, or if it's you using my password to access my email account via gmail. Yes, there may be ways to profile user behavior and make some educated guesses, but in my opinion, that invades privacy and there are other ways to protect your account that nullify that risk.

If you effectively leverage these solutions as a layered defense capability, you will have an extremely low likelihood of being the victim of a cyber issue, and if you are, then it's doubtful anything could have prevented it. At the end of the day, your security is in your hands.

Challenges Facing CISOs

I was recently asked to comment on what I believe are the biggest challenges facing the CISO or CSO as we venture closer to 2017. This past year was one where ransomware clearly dominated the early headlines, followed by email security and the ramifications of when personal emails are leaked publicly. The ransomware issue affected multiple health care institutions in high-profile ways that caused disruptions in the medical industry, highlighting apparent gaps and vulnerabilities in that critical infrastructure. Still, the affected organizations proved highly resilient as they executed their business continuity plans. The leaking of private and protected information via email also has had wide impacts on legal issues within the US as well as potentially affecting the pending Presidential election. That issue uprooted deep social, political, and legal debates across the country. Even more recently, news regarding the US releasing control of core Internet infrastructure and governance to international bodies, followed by a massive DDoS against a core DNS provider accomplished via a botnet comprised of IoT devices, revealed how dependent we are upon the Internet for every-day life, and how vulnerable our interconnectedness remains.

From this 2016 experience, we might be tempted to run to the critical infrastructure debate again as the next pressing issue for corporate Security Officers. We might also run to the topic of regulation and government oversight or proactive government protections through means like intelligence sharing etc. as the pressing issue that must be addressed in 2017. We may also be tempted to run to the topic of securing email and protecting our executives from being publicly embarrassed as the next big noble cause. Or, we might sound the alarm regarding the risks of interconnectedness and personal devices known as, the Internet of Things (IOT), calling for new solutions and standards to be adopted by providers in that sphere as yet another layer of regulation. Any such move would also likely stir the hornet's nest with regard to the personal privacy debate. Any or all of these topics might land on the various lists of predictions for security concerns in 2017 that are likely being drafted by marketing teams now.

However, in my opinion, these issues have already had their time in the spotlight. We've already identified them, debated them, regulated them, and industry has already provided solutions. Those solutions have had adequate bake-in time and are well matured. We already know how to prevent malware from installing onto our endpoints, regardless of the type. We have numerous layers of technology that can satisfy that mission for us. We have countless threat intelligence communities who regularly pass malware samples and identifiable attributes among each other. We know how to operate under disasters should our critical systems come under attack or be rendered otherwise inoperable. Business continuity and disaster recovery plans were all the rage in 2004, so we know how to operate if our protections fail us on a grand scale. We know how to secure email both in terms of preventing unauthorized access, and from allowing email to be used as a means for weaponization, delivery, and infiltration. The dynamic sandbox and file analysis book has been written, the solutions darn near perfected, complete with open source options. We also know how to mitigate DDoS, and we as both consumers and professionals expect life disruptions from that. The Hacktivist community beat that into our subconscious years ago with round after round of attacks against financial institutions that led to broad consumer awareness of the state of cyber security. You see, this is all old news. The impacts that permeated through 2016 weren't for a lack of technology or available preventative solutions.

The problem that 2016 highlighted is, we don't do what we know we should do. The real problem is, people in general are becoming increasingly aware of the cybersecurity issues and potential impacts of our interconnected world, but they don't understand what it takes in terms of resources and conformity to implement the right solutions, and we lack the discipline to adopt our lives to operating within those boundaries of propriety and security. What we lack is understanding and willingness to change or adapt our culture for the sake of security, and that is what I believe is the main challenge facing the modern CISO/CSO as we approach 2017; awareness without understanding, and corporate culture that refuses to change.

Executive leaders are inundated with a message of doom from the media, a message of defeatism from prior victims, which is exacerbated by the stream of new ideas elevated by the security industry. Executives and the public are being told, "security is broken," and they are drawn to the sales pitch that claims the latest approach to addressing problem x is finally the approach that we've been waiting for. The claim is that past attempts didn't work because we didn't have big data or automation or machine learning or whatever. These new solutions are ready off the shelf and sales teams market existing vendor partnerships to demonstrate the ease of integration within existing solutions. The fear of the cloud has subsided and now represents an marketing opportunity to re-tell the same old story under a new name. I recently heard the argument that said, "if we had already solved cyber security problems, why does the vendor floor at the RSA Security Conference keep growing?" That's an argument used by sales teams or businesses seeking investors, trying to convince you that something new is needed and they have just the thing. I can count off the top of my head five new start-ups in the past two years that I was asked to evaluate, each of which claimed they had finally solved a problem that no one else could figure out, but each of which represented a practical example of an old idea that lacked maturity and wisdom from the lessons learned over the past decades. None of them were new or unique, but they claimed to be, and were attractive to executives because they represented the latest start-up that was just waiting to bloom into the next huge Silicon Valley success story. If it used cloud or machine learning or AI, then surely it works right?

You see, there's this lie out there that claims we can't and haven't solved the cyber security challenges with technology. This message for some reason permeates the executive levels of many companies. They assume they can't solve the security problem, so they invest heavily in efforts to help them quickly remediate the pain. They assume that since solutions of the past didn't work (as exemplified by the constant stream of breaches), that practitioners from the past are irrelevant. Executives hear buzz words like "APT" and "nation state" and "threat actors" and assume those individuals or organizations are too sophisticated to defend against, and require something new. They hear the message of doom and gloom and succumb, meanwhile, they hire CISOs or CSOs and divert the responsibility to them, seeking the minimally viable solutions that enable them to operate as a business while satisfying regulatory and customer expectations. It's this mixed message of assured doom, unpreventable threats, the need to think of new and innovative methods, and a constant stream of start-ups that have us all confused.

The reality is, we have the solutions already. We've had them for a while now. What we lack is common understanding of the root problems and what it takes to solve them, and we lack the discipline to see those solutions through implementation and to adhere to the boundaries we must live in once they are established. You see the solutions are often expensive, intrusive, and will define structure around your day-to-day. They will define how your business can function. They will create friction above other, easier options. They will take time to implement, during which your window of risk will remain unmitigated. In the end, they will be effective, but companies and organizations have to understand what they are doing, they have to count the costs, and they have to accept what comes based on that decision. We have to learn to stay true to our decisions, not stray from them, and see our commitments through to the end. What remains in our way isn't a lack of technology; it's ourselves.

There's another factor that further complicates the CISO's effectiveness. Many companies today pride themselves in their culture, and they are adamantly against anything that challenges or causes that culture to change. I've even heard it from CISOs themselves:

"We have an open culture here and we want our employees to have open and free access to the Internet - to choose for themselves what they need to do to be the most productive at their jobs. We aren't going to get into the business of restricting access to websites based on the appropriateness of content or their hosted subject matter because who are we to decide that? Employees and their managers get to decide what is appropriate for themselves. We are going to focus on transparent security."

Corporations surrendered to employee culture in another highly visible way known throughout the industry as Bring Your Own Device or BYOD.

Herein lies the core problem. We, the security practitioners who do understand the problem, aren't willing to define and enforce safe boundaries, and we aren't willing to hold our employees accountable to operating within them, because that constricts "culture" or the "user experience" in a way that creates friction for the employee or consumer. Sometimes we are willing, but our executive or HR teams aren't. Culture to many companies is what defines them, and is the tool by which they attract new talent and retain who they have. How many times have you heard, "we don't do that here, because that's against our culture." I've even heard the phrase "we need to create frictionless solutions" so we don't disrupt the employee work experience. Ok, as long as that is your goal, you can't adopt the readily available and effective solutions that provide you the capabilities that will defend your organization against the outcomes your executive team is afraid of. In fact, I have observed debates within Information Security teams, that implementing a protection should be paused because if they create friction for the user, that's a "bad experience" that will have a negative impact on the Information Security team's reputation. That comes from yet another danger to the modern CISO/CSO; the temptation to be liked and viewed as a great leader, over the mission of being effective at your role. Now, I'm not advocating extremes here and I'm not saying the modern CISO has to be a bulldozer. There is a balance to be found and I think we're currently leaning toward the extreme of likability over security.

If you are a security practitioner, you've probably experienced this first hand. You've probably prepared to implement a solution that provides optimal security for your constituents, only to be told you have to pull back layers of protection to accommodate culture and reduce user friction. Those layers of reduced capability and accommodation create vulnerabilities and complexity in implementation. Complexity increases risk, cost and time to implement, and ability to maintain effectively. That increases overall program cost, and corporate boards and executives already view Information Security as a cost to do business that must be tightly controlled lest it out pace revenue generation. A valid concern no doubt, but one to temper with an effective CISO. A lack of understanding and balance can lead to reduced budgets and minimal capacity that becomes the root cause for why implementations of security capabilities fail or are so burdened with problems and friction. When the InfoSec program creates problems and friction, their reputation is damaged and their voice in future affairs is diminished, as are the career opportunities for the CISO. And so we become afraid of doing what is right because for some reason, we aren't willing to accept what it takes to do this right.

This is the core problem, and it's one that extends beyond the realm of Information Security.

The modern CISO or CSO isn't faced with a technology gap, but rather with an education and culture war, not unlike the battle we are seeing played out on a social scale throughout the United States. The modern CISO and CSO need to work diligently to understand the real problems and to educate up, out, and down - to ensure those making decisions and those affected by the decisions truly understand end-to-end the cybersecurity challenge. The CISO and CSO need to learn boldness but also humility, to be able to insert themselves into conversations and challenge their peers, but at the same time be willing to learn and grow with them. The CISO and CSO need to influence company culture and highlight the boundaries that culture can develop within, not to be dictated by culture that creates the vulnerabilities they are trying to mitigate. Then, once understood and defined, CISOs and CSOs can have effective and real conversations about what can be done and what it will take to be successful at information security. That conversation needs to be met with cultural flexibility on the part of the other executive staff members. Once resourced appropriately, the CISO still needs to deliver the goods, which takes diplomacy, patience, and wisdom. The quarterly business review and updates to the board of directors might be the same or may be representative of minimal incremental updates over time, but this is essential and we need to learn to be proud of that work and to see it through with patience and diligence. We also need other executives to embrace the boundaries and culture impact these new effective solutions will have, and we need them to enforce adoption and compliance within their organizations.

We need leaders who will use corporate email and all the security solutions that surround that, and to be careful and diligent with not only what they click or open, but also and more importantly so, with what they write and send.

Corporate leaders including CEOs and boards, need to seek CISOs and CSOs who have a long-standing and successful career at effectively practicing information security. These leaders will have the experience that can lead their executive peers to understanding, to help them navigate the challenges facing their organization, and to help shape culture. In the end, there will be boundaries and these should be carefully crafted collectively, but also upheld and protected as staunchly as the culture itself. Executives need to allow their security officers to uphold and enforce those boundaries. To help ensure the boundaries and methods are appropriate, today's CISOs and CSOs need to come from the field where they actually experienced the realization of the risks companies face today. The well practiced CISO will know what voices from industry to listen to, and they will know what works and what doesn't, and CEOs and business executives can trust in that. When the voice in the conversation has lived it, and survived it, they bring maturity and perspective that you cannot fabricate and that cannot be passed down from mentors. Executive peers need to recognize and respect that. These new CISOs and CSOs need to be diplomats and mentors; the type of people who get to know the company, it's culture, it's needs, and then present with unwavering determination backed by personal conviction, the solutions and steps that must be taken to reach the common goal of information security. They need to lead to a better state, even if that involves friction along the way. They can't be easily swept away by the company culture or the celebrity shock of executives (even those who are celebrities). They also need to be granted the authority they deserve, and they need to be right there at the table, engaged in business growth conversations, so they can understand and help craft company culture and strategy moving forward. They need to be veterans from the cyber battles that have been raging for almost 2 decades. Practitioners who have been there, done that.

Pick your analogy: the gold medal athlete returning from the Olympic games to open a gym; the retiring veteran returning from decades of war to open an outdoors gear store; the former CEO who led a successful business looking now for a seat on a board; the sea captain calling this his final season and looking forward to joining the industry that designed the ships he has spent his life on etc. This is who you need to find as a CISO or CSO; the practitioner who was successful, who has been there, who knows where you are headed, and who has the wisdom born from experience to show you how. If you are an aspiring or existing security officer who doesn't fit this mold, you may not be up for the challenges you are facing in the coming years.

If you are a security executive, solving the challenges facing you in 2017, starts with building the right relationships with your peers to reach a place where you can be heard and your voice respected. You need to become part of the team and need to demonstrate wisdom and experience that will establish the trust you seek. You need to surround yourself with successful security practitioners and you need to elevate their experiences and wisdom into the executive conversation to enable common understanding. You need to educate up and influence down. You need to bring truth into the confusing cyber security debate and influence company culture, not be dictated by it and tossed around by the shifting current caused by the latest craze. You need to diplomatically find your seat at the table with the business leadership to help define the path forward together, serving as that point of reference that the business and corporation can use to maintain true north. You need to stand by your experiences and appropriately challenge your peers when necessary. Finally, you need patience and endurance to stay true to accomplishing what you set out to accomplish without diverting to entertain the latest new product or tool. You need to establish yourself, humbly, as the authority and subject matter expert, and you need to hold your executive peers accountable to the charter of information security.

You need to do what you know is the right thing to do, but doing follows understanding, and you can't do this alone. You need to help your peers understand, and let that understanding, together, define what you do and how you do it.

I am not advocating in any way a CISO or CSO who has a "my way or the highway" style, nor one who builds and executes through pride and subversion. I'm advocating for the seasoned security practitioners who can speak confidence, truth, and wisdom into the executive teams, and who has the maturity to stay true to what they believe and to hold their peers accountable to what they need, not necessarily what they want.

Otherwise, we will have employees building email servers in their basement, or leveraging Gmail without basic MFA enabled to conduct official company business, and when they are exposed, the finger pointing will come back on the CISO and the CISO will point to a lack of solutions from industry, and the cycle will continue.