Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Weekly Threat Trends March 11-18 2013



Vulnerabilities, Tools, and Tactics

Android app developer licenses being sold in malware black market for $100 each, providing buyers “unfettered access to the official Google Play app store.” At least one purchase, accredited to a banking Trojan author has been leaked. http://t.co/o7nAiecghy

Malware authors using fictitious business created legally in Brazil to generate application certificates, using them to sign malware to evade detection. http://t.co/U1gBpwXI5a

According to a report by Websense, 85% of websites used in attacks during 2012 were “legitimate sites.”

Related: Israeli website for “international institute for counter-terrorism used in wateringhole attack to deliver malware. http://bit.ly/X4TZ1p

Seagate blog website used to serve malware http://bit.ly/ZsiEii

Fake Bank of America Online Digital Certificate themed emails used in phishing attack. http://bit.ly/WkYSGc

Travnet Trojan implicated in APT campaign http://bit.ly/10WKoei

Blackhole, Sweet Orange, and Cool exploit kits named top weapons for cyber crooks http://bit.ly/10WJRyi

ArchiveLock Trojan used in France and Spain targeted attacks to encrypt the files of users, demanding $5,000 ransom http://bit.ly/100CZ07

Adversary Activity & Campaigns

Decoy ICS/SCADA Water Utility Networks hit by attacks http://ubm.io/ZOplV1

Warning of vulnerabilities among California energy providers http://bit.ly/XiuzNK

US Department of State and Pentagon’s Army National Guard websites hacked through SQL injection and XSS scripting attacks by Tunisian Cyber Army with assistance from Al Qaida Electronic Army. Purpose appears to be to gain information for upcoming OpBlackSummer, which the attackers claim us being coordinated with Chinese hackers. http://t.co/Axd3ylFYQc

APT1 Watch: Royal Bank of Australia (RBA), documents released in 2012 acknowledge victim status of at least two breaches in 2011 with close connections to APT1. http://t.co/YtN2Z0KI6k

ADP Package Delivery Notification phishing attack directs victims to Blackhole Exploit Kit websites http://bit.ly/ZOqnFZZ

Cyber Attack heads-up: campaign announced to “wipe Israel from the Internet on April 7, 2013.

Bank watch: JP Morgan Chase website taken down through denial-of-service http://cnet.co/ZM57UH

US NIST National Vulnerability Database hacked and taken offline for days http://bit.ly/16umBld

Continued in reports of hacktivism

42 Russian websites hacked by SiR Abdou  http://t.co/5K2OzhXvd4

Celebrity financial information and social security numbers leaked following hack of free credit report provider http://bit.ly/15KAbpl

OpBlackSummer: US Govnerment sites hacked http://bit.ly/Z1DmWJ - Possible preparation for larger event

Toshiba Turkey Website defaced by reMin hacker http://bit.ly/Z1DiWZ

Anonymous takes down political party website in Italy http://bit.ly/Z1E2vw

Indian Hacker “Godzilla” infiltrates Pakistan government websites and leaks information http://bit.ly/YkHykr

Service Center Website of Acer Thailand defaced by Turkish hacker http://bit.ly/YtNynP

Anonymous attacks Philippines President and related government websites http://bit.ly/YtNNzu

Poland Sergianist hackers destroy popular Traditionalist website http://bit.ly/Zsiojc

Syrian Cyber Eagles defaces Saudi General Authority for Tourism and Antiquities website http://bit.ly/Zkfmyi

Anonymous defaces Philippines National Telecommunications Commission website http://bit.ly/Z97Wuu

152 Spanish websites hacked in protest against the deaths of 7 Moroccan immigrants http://bit.ly/107uw1z    

Defense and Response News

Pentagon creating new teams to launch cyberattacks http://wapo.st/Y9GNbC

UK develops global cyber security capacity, supported by the ICSPA http://bit.ly/;Z1DVQo

HBGary releases virtual classroom for incident response professional http://bit.ly/Zsibwp

Cyber-attacks eclipse terrorism in impact according to US leaders http://bit.ly/15SWHwx


Friday, March 15, 2013

Weekly Threat Trends March 3-11 2013


Vulnerabilities, Tools, and Tactics


Rogue Apache modules appear to be the source of a surge in iFrame injection attacks targeting legitimate websites like those used in the NBC.com compromise, to drive traffic to the Blackhole exploit kit. How the rogue modules are being injected is still unknown: http://t.co/29C1kXMLmA

Malicious Java applet uses certificate stolen from Clearesult Consulting to exploit trust and install automatically: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=14557

A report released from Cenzic claims 99% of web applications remain vulnerable to attacks, calling for increased emphasis on mitigation: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=14556

Free malicious Java applet generating tool discovered in the wild. The tool can clone a legitimate website, creates a malicious java applet, then redirect victims to a site of the attackers choice: http://t.co/4oDZsDdAL5

Web browser proxy auto-configuration tactic used in recent banking campaigns in Brazil to capture and redirect certain user traffic, expected to increase in use globally. http://t.co/V1s2TB2lCL

Example of Android mobile malware commoditization found in an ad for the tool “perkele lite,” used to intercept and forward SMS messages. http://t.co/10o3vJmrXj

Adversary Activity & Campaigns


Bank DDoS attacks resume: Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, believed to be directly supported by the Iranian government, announced and began execution of a new phase of attacks targeting US banks. http://t.co/E1UVVqamX0 , http://t.co/3oGt2BKE6A

Emerging phishing campaigns, exploiting payroll and banking trustADP TotalSource Payroll Invoice: http://t.co/5n8QilMqqM Bank of America: http://t.co/YlRBbncKJS

Targeted attack against Australia’s central bank, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) succeeded in compromising at least one system. Target of the attack was information which included Group of 20 negotiations. China is implicated. http://t.co/iHxZwwwp0W

Kaspersky discovers AlbaBotnet being used to target Chilean banks in an emerging campaign. http://www.securitybistro.com/blog/?p=5524

APT-1: Industry reporting attribution of past campaigns to APT-1, including US, Japan, and India victims, thanks to indicators from Mandiant’s report. One example: http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/apt1-themed-spear-phishing-campaign-linked-china-030613 , http://t.co/iQ4DrbJkn0 ,



Surge in reports of hacktivism

Czech central bank, stock exchange, banks hacked: http://t.co/WCA5c3yodYNullcrew defaces Time Warner Cable: http://t.co/yPJ4aK2e1TArabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) by QuisterTow: http://t.co/bDCrpnRKQBSaudi Aramco Twitter account hacked: http://t.co/RmQxB532aa54 Israeli sites hacked and defaced: http://t.co/YySGtJhf0GOver 180 Egypt sites hacked by P@khTuN: http://t.co/SJkUTcjq3u


Defense and Response News


China, in response to Mandiant and related APT-1 claims, begins a response campaign claiming they are the victim of repeated US sourced intrusions, calls for new international agreements on cyber: http://t.co/HO1NvvvZ6l , http://t.co/YmGGkZI2QW

Deutsche Telekom unveils real-time map of global cyber-attacks detected on their global infrastructure: http://t.co/We0TJJ6YOk

Microsoft launches new Cybercrime Center to combat piracy and malware: http://t.co/wllk2eJ0cw

New cyber security, forensics center formed by UMASS to advance research on cyber security and forensics theory: http://www.uml.edu/News/stories/2013/Cyber-forensics-center.aspx

Prolexic successfully defends against large scale DDoS against utility: http://t.co/yg6iU0Sx7g

Monday, March 4, 2013

Weekly Open Source Threat Report - 2/26/2013 - 3/3/2013


Vulnerabilities, Tools, and Tactics

MiniDuke malware discovered by Kaspersky and CrySys, has infected government computers from numerous nations. The malware was delivered through PDFs containing exploits written for Adobe Reader versions 9, 10, and 11. Researchers have not revealed the nature or mission of the malware yet. http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/kaspersky-crysys-warn-of-miniduke-malware.html

Multiple Java 0-Days released last week with ties to Bit9 hack from the previous week. Articles from FireEye reference the malware as McRAT. http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/researchers-link-latest-java-zero-day-exploit-bit9-hack-213798


Adversary Activity & Campaigns

Chinese attackers from Mandiant’s APT1 targeted 23 US energy infrastructure companies during a 2011-2012 campaign, exfiltrating data which would allow them to access and control oil and natural gas industrial-control systems. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/441095/20130301/energy-infrastructure-targeted-chinese-hackers.htm.

Anonymous gained access to and published email communications between a contractor and Bank of America security staff exposing a monitoring program intended to keep tabs on the hacktivist group. The “hack” wasn’t a breach of BofA systems as Anonymous reported the server they obtained the emails from was open to external access and controlled by the security researcher.

Evernote hacked, data on 50 million users exposed including usernames and passwords. Change your password now!

Crescent healthcare confirms breach of patient records and social security numbers. Breach occurred on December 28, 2012, however Crescent will not release information on how it happened. http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/crescent-healthcare-acknowledges-security-breach.html

Sabah land dispute conflict transitions from physical to cyber as forces from Malaysia and the Philippines target each other’s government websites. http://www.zdnet.com/ph/hackers-take-sabah-conflict-to-cyberspace-7000012061/

Team Cymru uncovers a state-controlled cyber campaign leaking 1 Terabyte of data every day from US based systems to foreign countries. Report is currently private, details to follow. http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/27/4035378/new-report-finds-hackers-stealing-terabyte-daily

Defense and Response News

Offensive security group CrowdStrike takes over and shuts down the Kelihos botnet with 110,000 infected nodes. CrowdStrike used a DNS injection attack to redirect the command and control channels used by infected systems, notified all the victims, and shut down the botnet in an offensive campaign. http://www.scmagazine.com/new-version-of-kelihos-botnet-with-110k-nodes-cut-down/article/234036/

Increased calls from public for improved collaboration between government, private, and public cyber security organizations to defend against adversaries like Mandiant’s APT1.

IDF defines Cyber Warfare as the 5th realm of warfare and established Cyber Command, bridging forces from the Intelligence and Teleprocessing branches. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/idf-forms-new-force-to-combat-cyber-warfare.premium-1.506979?block=true

Australia joins the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime following the passing of the Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Bill 2011. Among other empowerments, the legislation requires ISPs to store data on persons deemed under suspicion by law-enforcement. http://www.zdnet.com/australia-joins-convention-on-cybercrime-treaty-7000012071/

Friday, February 22, 2013

Mandiant APT1 Report Response


Outlining the geopolitical significance of this week's exposure of APT1

An emerging report...more to come

Introduction

On February 19, Mandiant released a detailed report on the Advanced Persistent Threat group they termed APT1. This is the same group referred to among security researchers and defense contractors as the Comment Gang, or Comment Group, or WebC2. Their names were derived from their common tactic of using html comment tags embedded within websites to distribute command and control functions to victim systems. The report outlines the activities, targets, tools, techniques, and procedures used by the group since at least 2004. Besides TTPs, Mandiant included evidence defining the true identity of the group as China’s Military Defense Unit 61398 as well as physical operating locations and some of the personas used by the group. In addition to the main report exposing the group, Mandiant released a series of related documents containing indicators which can be used to defend against and detect the adversary’s current infrastructure.

In summary, the report exposes a systematic program under the direct control of China’s government leadership and operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) targeting the economic sectors of the United States and allies in order to steal the intellectual property required to sustain economic growth within China. This is an attack on our economy.

The report itself is largely non-technical allowing any reader the ability to grasp the significance of what is being presented.

http://intelreport.mandiant.com/

Significance

The greatest significance can be found in this report’s overarching message to China: we see you and we’re doing something about it. A second major impact of this report is the fact that it shatters the notion that nation-state espionage is isolated to government targets and their supply chain including defense contractors. The APT1 report definitively maps PLA operations and strategic government initiatives to economic espionage and property theft. The adversary is no longer a vague term referring to an unknown group somewhere in the world. We’re talking about the government of China. We’re talking about disrupting their economy by stopping their Cyber espionage and theft. This may well represent the catalyst for major geopolitical change.

The immediate value of this report is that it will likely disrupt the adversary’s operational capability for some time as corporations bolster defenses by implementing immediate controls. The infrastructure put in place by the PLA is not easily dismantled. Their missions and targets were conceived by the political party as essential to sustaining their government, and likely required extensive efforts to implement operations as they stand today. They will be forced to shut down operations, or continue while migrating quietly. Not only were the adversary’s specific behavioral indicators exposed, but this report shows the extent of US counter-espionage capabilities in the commercial, UNCLASSIFIED sphere. If there was any notion by the adversary that they were functioning in stealth, that notion should be well dissolved by now.

This report describes the ultimate cyber war; siphoning out the tools that allow a great society to sustain, through years of silent espionage, theft, and re-use. Hence the ripple effect this report will likely trigger will grow as it expands. As US organizations implement mitigations, if done well, doing so will result in significant economic downturn for China.

Readers of the Mandiant report will note the mission orders of this group are derived from the PLA regarding those markets and industries critical to China’s growth as defined in their “Five Year Plan.” Thus Cyber operations are essential to continuing the sustainability of their government. For whatever reasons, they are unable to grow organically and have decided at the strategic political level that they must reach out and steal to survive. If they cannot grow, they cannot sustain. If they cannot sustain, their government will collapse. Cyber espionage is an instrument of sustainment for China’s government. US companies are the targets. Without this program, they will not survive and this report blows their cover.

This report also forces response from the highest levels of our society. While bloggers, pundits, researchers, and media have long broadcast the government of China as the original and most prolific APT, definitive responses from those enabled to effect change have yet to materialize. The name-and-shame pundits have been restricted and ignored, often for political reasons or due to the lack of elicit evidence tracing a group to a government. I have also heard executives make claims like “we don’t want to offend because we don’t want to risk losing business,” while politicians fear angering a major trade partner. Those near-sighted excuses will result in self-destruction in the long-term. China is paying for or supporting our businesses now, but as they are doing that, they are siphoning off intellectual property so they can replicate technology, goods, and services internally so that they become the world’s greatest provider. The damage to our own economy should China realize their mission, is incalculable. Their actions place the sustainability of our society at risk. If China can produce goods and services at the same quality as US providers at cheaper costs to the consumer, then free-market principles will result in economic collapse.

I believe this history of a lack of effective response is due to the relatively vague connections drawn between active cyber campaigns and the PLA in the past. This discussion has largely remained quarantined in the vaults of information classification. While everyone has been saying this publically, no one has been proving it. This report demands action and eliminates the excuses used to evade this topic in the past, namely those who cite unconfirmed reports as their shelter.

Never before have I seen evidence like this linking China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to this group, or any international espionage in a public discussion. Private intelligence sharing groups have long kept these details hidden, and public disclosure essentially counters the principles behind keeping the data protected; namely that now that the adversary has been so publically exposed, they will likely hide. However this reasoning misses the greater impact full disclosure can have. The security world is clearly divided about this action by Mandiant, but again, those fears are near-sighted.

If you expose your adversary, you can effectively counter their capabilities and mitigate the threat they represent.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

The Mac Security Myth

You know that feeling you get when someone declares something so boldly which you know is absolutely wrong? It's that moment when you interpret what they said which triggers an internal struggle of trying to decide if you should correct them or not. With kids it's easy; your correct them. With adults, it's harder because there's that whole pride and sensitivities thing involved. In that moment a feeling begins which sort of blends sympathy, "oh man they have no idea what they are talking about," with the driving need to show your knowledge. You brain calls for instruction on how to respond; smile or correct. I was recently on the recipient end of this when I pronounced a medical condition of mine to a friend who is a doctor. He's decided that smiling at people when they are wrong doesn't help them, and so he proceeded to correct my terminology. 

And so in honor of standing up for what is true, Mac users, I have bad news.

The cringe moment I wrote of before for me is triggered when I hear people say something like, "I don't have to worry about cyber threats because I use a Mac and Macs are secure." As someone who has been practicing cyber defense and threat analysis for over a decade, I can't help but cry a little inside when I hear that. Another common one I hear comes when someone who uses a Microsoft Windows based system complains to their Apple yielding friend about an infection. Their Apple buddy retorts with something like, "You should switch to a Mac so you can't get infected. There aren't any viruses for Macs."

<insert cringe/pucker face here>

While this misconception is perpetuated among uninformed Apple fans, Apple themselves have done an incredible injustice to their consumers by stoking these false assumptions through their marketing campaigns and suppression of talking about this in public. I recall a commercial that ran for a while within the "I'm a Mac, and I'm a PC" series where the PC becomes infected and the Mac says something like "I don't have to worry about that." Sorry, that's wrong. Let me burst your bubble with some hard facts:

Apple Malware Exists in Spades

Security research firm and services provider, SOPHOS, revealed in their report, "Security Threats in 2013," that they detected on average 4,900 Mac based malware infections per month last year. Ironically, the majority of these are types of fake anti-virus software. So people who don't think they need to secure their Mac because there are no viruses are being duped into installing fake AV. In 2012 the Flashback malware which uniquely targeted Macs gained public notoriety and is expected to have infected more than 700,000 Macs worldwide. With numbers like that, one can hardly make a claim so called viruses are only a PC problem. Perhaps it's a matter of defining what the word "is" is as former president Bill Clinton became notorious for saying.

4,900 Mac malware detection per month in 2012 by one security firm alone!!

http://www.sophos.com/en-us/security-news-trends/reports/security-threat-report.aspx?utm_source=STR2013&utm_medium=Cross-link&utm_campaign=STR2013-CL-PollDaddy

Coincidentally, this week Apple released an update to their iOS (version 6.1) which fixed 27 significant vulnerabilities in their mobile operating system, 20 of which can be leveraged by an attacker to execute code remotely on your Apple device. Considering the fact that iOS 6.0 was released in September 2012 means your precious Apple has been sitting their vulnerable for over three months. Has anyone been taking advantage of these vulnerabilities on your device? If you believe there's no security problem, then you probably don't have detection and prevention software like AntiVirus or AntiMalware installed, and so you simply don't know if you are a victim or not. Ignorance is bliss right?

Ever heard of jail-breaking your iPhone? That is malware at it's finest. Yes, it's a root level exploit which takes control of the entire system and changes core functions (including security mechanisms), allowing users to run and integrate features otherwise prevented. That's hacking.

Apple is Slow to Patch Vulnerabilities

More bad news. The weakness exploited by the Flashback malware were reported 9 months before massive outbreaks became public knowledge. Microsoft released patches in mid-February 2012, while massive outbreaks spread among Mac users through March, and Apple finally released an update in late April. That is horrendous.

One of the fixes released this week by Apple addresses a vulnerability announced in 2011 while another removes fraudulent Google certificates issued in December by TURKTRUST root certificate authority. Certificates are used by your browser to validate it has connected to the correct servers when you browse the Internet. This prevents someone from putting up a fake Google.com website (or any other website) without your browser knowing it and warning or stopping you. However, if someone can send your browser a fake certificate through a root certificate authority like TURTRUST, one that matches their fake website, then when you browse on over to the fake site (say Google.com to check your Gmail or Google Plus or any other Google service), you'll be hitting that fake site and entering your data trusting the information is safe in the hands of who it should be. Iran used this tactic in 2012 to identify all political dissidents in the country who were using Gmail to communicate with outsiders via the Internet. In the case of the TURKTRUST mishap, Google issued a warning the same day and Microsoft issued fixes that week. Apple took over a month!

http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability-management/167901026/security/vulnerabilities/240147216/ios-6-1-fixes-27-vulnerabilities.html

This shows a significant risk imposed on Apple users by their slow-to-patch response. Even still, because Apple has perpetuated this myth that they are inherently secure, users may not even worry about installing updates and patches, leaving them exposed for even longer periods of time.

Ok, so I've hopefully broken two false assumptions so far; yes, there is Mac malware, and yes your Mac does have security weaknesses. You might be asking yourself, but is it more secure than Windows? That's not an easy question to answer but I'll try.

False Sense of Security

Apple has long benefited from what we in industry call security through obscurity. That means they are secure because they are insignificant. They are insignificant (in number of users) and so they aren't targeted. It's like saying in a group of 50 people, you are safe because there's plenty of other targets around you. It has nothing to do with your actual state of personal security. There is some truth to that. While the modern adversary can be quite sophisticated, they are also in many ways like us. They need strong return on investment and focus on the path of least resistance. Their target surface has some common attributes. The mass majority of computers in the world run a Microsoft operating system.  If an adversary can create one new form of malware that affects 99% of their target victims, then that's where they are going to focus their effort. Even better, if they can find a flaw in an application used by both platforms (say JAVA), then they cover everyone. Still, they focus on Windows because the majority of computers out there are Windows based. This approach to security works as long as you remain background noise. The moment you become and object of interest, it's game over. Creating Mac targeting malware is also an insignificant task. I've heard some people claim that it's easy for hackers to create Windows malware because Windows is so full of "holes" but Mac malware is hard to create. That's simply nonsense. More and more we in the researcher community are seeing simultaneous releases of new malware that affects multiple platforms; Windows and OS X.

The tide is already changing. Apple's popularity thanks to their cool looks and "i" line of products (iMac, iPhone, iPods, and iPads), is drawing more users away from Microsoft, thus reducing the shadow they've hidden behind for all these years. They are becoming a larger target for the adversary. SOPHOS reports that among companies surveyed, 52% plan on issuing more Macs to employees in 2013. The move away from Apple's proprietary hardware into the Intel common hardware market also means virtualizing Intel based software no longer requires trading performance for style. Now you can get both. Now you can run Windows on your Mac without much performance difference. This means the Mac is becoming more popular, and actually viable for most users including the enterprise. The most sophisticated malware out there starts in the government and enterprise world, then moves public. As enterprises adopt Apple, the adversary will change their attention and will develop new capabilities unique to that platform, which will make their way to the public very quickly. This isn't a prediction, it's happening.

This trend is proving itself as multiple reports showed significant increases in unique Mac malware released  in 2012. As the pendulum swings, so is the adversaries attention. Fortunately for iOS users, the Android open app development environment is still too tempting to part from so I think the adversary will stay there for a while. But, that's not the case for OS X.

Without repeating too much of what I wrote in a previous article, the primary flaw in cybersecurity is you. Adversaries know this and so they use tactics which exploit you, or mostly your inherent trust in the Internet and your own computing device. Their primary paths of entry into your computer are your email inbox and your web browser. Again, as I previously documented in a past article, Safari (Apple's web browser) has significant security gaps just as IE does. Also, as mentioned before, the primary method of exploiting a computer via the browser is to use a vulnerability in a 3rd party application like JAVA. Since both Windows and OS X use a 3rd party provider (Adobe) to supply them JAVA, they are both vulnerable to weaknesses in JAVA.

Yes, OS X does include some features to prevent administrative functions from automatically executing (this was their primary claim to security for a long time), but so does Windows as of version 7. Because most malware requires the ability to make system level changes to persist, this prevention mechanism can be effective (when the malware doesn't evade it by using an application which already has hooks into administrative level tasks). It used to be that Windows users were by default system administrators, making it easier for malware to establish a foothold. Windows 7 changed this and added the security feature of monitoring all running processes and warning you whenever one attempts a administrative function. Apple was also early to incorporate network access controls of their platforms, but Microsoft's inclusion of the Windows firewall as met this capability as well. They are competitors after all.

Since the primary threat vectors are the same, and the target is the same (you), and the primary defense is the same, what then is left? Patching and application control. It's about ensuring your system and applications are not vulnerable, and monitoring those applications for abuse or malicious behavior. Those two areas are strengths of Microsoft, and significant weaknesses of Apple. Again, because Windows is so widely used, the number of available applications far exceeds those available for OS X. This means by nature, there are more possible points of vulnerabilities to control. Security through obscurity.

You can't exploit what isn't vulnerable and patches fix vulnerabilities. I hear people moan and groan all the time about the weekly patches from Microsoft. The IT world lovingly refers to this weekly event as "Patch Tuesday." However, if a critical flaw is discovered in Windows or an associated application, at least we know we only have to worry until Tuesday. Apple is notoriously slow at releasing security updates, sometimes taking several months. They have no defined or regular patch cycle. Updates are released as Apple get's around to it. Microsoft was forced into this rapid pace of releasing updates through user pressure. No such pressure exists for Apple, because a) use is still really low and b) they perpetuate the idea that Macs are inherently safe. Being a minority in a market means you are shielded by the majority. It's that simple. Microsoft takes the brunt because they are the biggest and have more users.

Then there's application control which is mostly administered through AntiVirus or AntiMalware products in the public market. Windows users are well accustomed to needing and using AV, and the AV market is well mature in terms of effective products. If you believe you don't have a malware problem, then you probably aren't running any sort of AntiMalware software on your Mac. This means you have no way to stop malware from running or knowing if it exists except through the native Apple permissions control feature. This feature warns you and prompts for an administrator password when system changes are being made (or an application is attempting to). If you are relying on this, then you are assuming the malware hasn't bypassed that mechanism and that you know everytime you enter your password, exactly what that application is doing in the background. You have no idea if that file you opened contains malware...all you know is you needed to enter your password to open it.

Secret Society

Apple is very secretive and closed. As a fond user of the Apple TV and iPad, I'm often frustrated by their policies which control content and apps so strictly. For example, I can't stream my Amazon cloud content through my Apple TV because Apple won't let Amazon develop an app without promising a certain level of revenue sharing. Same goes for the Amazon Kindle app; you can no longer buy books directly through the app. They are also very quiet on releasing new products and product updates. They develop in secret and closely control what is allowed on their products. I thought Microsoft was sued over this a few years ago...oh yeah, they were. This secretive approach permeates everything they do...including security.

Maintaining their image of a secure platform is mission critical for Apple.

However, they are noticeably absent in the world of threat information exchanges and cybersecurity conferences. In 2012 I attended the annual Blackhat conference in Las Vegas where security researchers (good guys and bad guys) come together to present new ideas and findings. Microsoft was there in a big way, talking about security and reaching out to the researcher community to promote an open dialog. Apple was absent. This is a common scene at every security conference I've been to over the past 12 years. Wherever cybersecurity is being discussed, Microsoft is there, Apple is a no show. They simply don't talk about security in the public. This makes them even more prone to weaknesses and exploitation. In the world of intelligence sharing, there is a balance between divulging information which can aid or expose the adversary, with divulging information to aid the defenders. Apple doesn't participate in this exchange very well. As adversaries use their tools, once exposed the game's up. Everyone defends. With Apple, they suppress notifications which means the adversary (like in the case of Flashback) has a long time to wreak havoc on their targets. Once Apple is forced into the public light (as with Flashback), they suddenly respond.

This lack of visibility also means no accountability. If Microsoft knows about a vulnerability, and the public knows, then all users (government, commercial  and consumer) put on the pressure. If no one knows about an Apple flaw, then there's no pressure. If Apple is made aware, but the public isn't, then there is no accountability. Works well for them, no so well for us.

Conclusions

For these reasons (slow patching, false claims of security, real threats, and detachment), I believe Apple products are less secure than their Microsoft counterparts. More specifically, I believe Apple users are at greater risk than are Microsoft users.

The key is of course practicing smart Internet use. Don't panic, and switch back. Don't dump that investment. But do get yourself a quality AntiVirus or AntiMalware solution for that Mac, check for updates regularly, and be careful with web browsing and email.

Just please, for the love of Pete, don't go buy a Mac simply because you think it's more secure. You won't be.


Thursday, January 17, 2013

Web Exploits and Intrusion Detection Systems


Introduction

Over the past year, I have observed a significant decrease in the number of detections of modern threats among organizations protected by traditional Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) while those monitored by community intelligence based solutions and behavioral analysis have shown increases. Meanwhile organizations are becoming increasingly educated about modern threats and have been seeking confirmation that their chosen products can address these threats. Organizations and their executives are expecting their staff to show them where they have been compromised and attacked, however the traditional configurations employed are not producing data representing detections of modern threat activity. Relying on these vendor produced solutions alone has forced some to conclude that their networks are clean when in reality they are deeply infiltrated. Representing adequate threat coverage has become an increasing challenge as a result.

Highly Pervasive Threats

Recent surges in exploit delivery kits and the evolution away from direct exploitation has largely moved the bulk of Internet based attacks to a passive model. The sharing of resources and monetization of exploit kits has resulted in a surge of weapons and variants available to the adversary and has eased the process of exploitation. Additionally the increasing use of encoding and encryption to hide malicious content has decreased the visibility the IDS has over the session. Traditionally an adversary would scan a network, find applications they could interact with, and attempt to directly deliver exploit code to them.

Weaponization: From a kill chain perspective, industry is seeing pervasive threats weaponize files like documents (MS Office, Adobe PDF, MS Excel), as well as active Internet content (Java, Flash) by embedding exploit code within them and hiding this code through obfuscation tactics including encoding and encryption. In this new model the “attack” has become akin to successfully delivering the weaponized file to a victim and executing it locally. The weapons themselves have become additional delivery channels, often exploiting a vulnerability in an Internet based application to download a final stage package containing the core malware.

Delivery: Rather than identifying a specific target and launching a custom or tool driven direct attack by delivering exploit code directly to the vulnerable application, adversaries are using embedded weapons like mines throughout the Internet and luring unwitting victims to them through phishing, injecting into legitimate websites, and creating malicious versions of seemingly legitimate websites. One tactic recently discovered and employed by the adversary is the monitoring of top news and creating malicious websites purporting to be related or hosting information about the story. JavaScript, iFrame, PHP, and CGI is being commonly used to redirect a user’s browser to access content unintended by the user. As users are lured to the delivery websites, they are exposed to the exploit through passive actions which often result in their inadvertent requesting of the weaponized file. These delivery websites are often temporary and dynamic making tracking difficult. They get registered through free online domain registry sites using fake personas and change quickly or go silent after first use. This tactic is used by the adversary to evade black list attempts by defenders to prevent or detect known malicious websites.

Exploitation: When exposed to one of these delivery sites, the client application (web browser) receives the weaponized file still in its obfuscated state. The weaponized file (JavaScript, Flash, PDF etc.) containing the encoded or encrypted contents also includes decode or decrypt functions which are performed within the client application during execution, finally exposing the exploit code to the application and resulting in a compromise. With these exploit kits, this is usually the first stage. The application has been exploited and is then used to retrieve and execute an additional malware package which results in a system level compromise.

Example from Blackhole: A lab test conducted using the Blackhole Exploit Kit resulted in the following progression:
Initial redirect: GET <baddomain>/main.php?page=<string>

Weapon retrieval
: GET /archive=”Leh.jar” loads the Java applet in the browser and triggers the next stage
Second stage: GET /w.php?f=<string> about 2 seconds later, served “contacts.exe” in response

Exploitation: contacts.exe executed on the local system performing persistent changes

Compromise symptoms: A new application on the victim system began generating repetitive HTTP GET requests using a User-Agent string of “Windows 98” which did not match any known applications previously installed.

A compilation of the most active exploit kits which leverage this model is represented below. A keyword based cross reference of the exploit kits against a leading Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) vendor’s content encyclopedias was conducted to find if there were any IPS/IDS, AV, App Control, or other signatures available to address these adversary tools. The results are included below.

Redkit: 0 references found
NeoSploit: 0 references found
Cool Exploit kit: 0 IPS references
Blackhole: 0 IPS references found, numbers virus results
Nuclear Pak: 1 reference in IPS to an RFI related attack (not the exploit kit) and 1 RAT sig
Crimeboss: 0 references found
Cridex: 0 IPS references
Phoenix: 0 IPS references
TDS Sutra: 0 references found
Sweet orange: 0 references

These exploit kits each represent a delivery system. The weapons used within each exploit kit can vary from user to user, however they often use a common set of standard exploits. A review of the 2012 exploits used by these kits as noted by their Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) reference is listed below. A keyword search within the same IPS vendor’s threat encyclopedia using the CVE identifier of the specific exploits used by each of these kits was conducted and found at least one signature match for each exploit.

CVE-2012-4969 (Java 0-day used in blackhole) – 1 prevention signature
CVE-2012-4681 (Java 0-day used in NeoSploit, Blackhole, Redkit, Nuclear, Crimeboss, Sweet Orange) – 2 prevention signatures
CVE-2012-1723 (Java exploit used in Blackhole, Cool, NeoSploit, Nuclear) – 1 prevention signature
CVE-2012-1535 (Flash 0-day exploit) – 1 prevention signature
CVE-2012-0779 (Flash targeted exploit, Phoenix) – 1 prevention signature
CVE-2012-1875 (MS IE exploit) – 1 prevention signature
CVE-2012-0507 (Java exploit used in Redkit, Phoenix, Blackhole, Cool) – 1 prevention signature

A review of these vendor threat encyclopedia articles validates they appear to be directly related to detecting the exploits associated with each of the vulnerabilities. The articles also reference the correct delivery model for the exploits targeting active Internet content (ie malicious websites) and the vulnerable application (ie Java). From this finding, one conclusion could be drawn that the IPS vendor has the ability to detect these modern day exploit kits because they have signatures that detect the exploit code associated with the exploits used by the kits. Another conclusion can be drawn that since the vendor did not reference these exploit kits by name, their approach appears to be to focus on the actual exploit code and not how it is used.

Lab Tests

Testing actual system exploitation in a lab using some of these exploit kits resulted in 0 detections by a leading IPS system (the same vendor referenced above) running configurations validated by the vendor’s technical resources. The logical question is if the product has detection content to address these exploits, then why is it not detecting the activity?

A Lesson in Obfuscation

The reason the before mentioned exploit kits have become so highly effective and pervasive is they each employ various methods of obfuscation and encryption to hide the exploit payload from inspection by technology such as IDS/IPS. Recall the Weaponization, Delivery, and Exploitation sections above. The exploit code is not passed directly between the “attacker” and victim in normal clear syntax for inspection by the IDS, but rather encoded within websites or within files transferred to the victim. All of these kits use an intermediary application or file to obfuscate and carry the exploit code to the target where it is exposed only during execution, not during the delivery stage where IDS can inspect the payload. Encoding comes in various forms including character substitution, XOR, base64, string reversal, custom encoding, encryption etc. The basic progression is:

  1. User browses to malicious website containing “clean” HTML, PHP, or CGI code
  2. Website contains HTML, PHP, or often an iFrame which instructs the browser to retrieve a secondary active content file (usually JavaScript or Flash) – no exploit code is in the HTML, PHP, or CGI
  3. This file contains the obfuscated or encoded exploit code which cannot be inspected by the IDS/IPS (because it’s encoded)
  4. The file is received by the client and loaded into the browser where the contents are decoded and the exploit executed
  5. Game over

Competitive and Community Solutions

Some in the competitive field have taken a more proactive approach to threat detection, focusing not on the actual exploit, but rather the delivery model and methods to perform the initial detection. The threat community group called “Emerging Threats” lead by researcher Matt Jonkman takes this approach a step further by developing detection signatures based on the behaviors of delivery and exploitation as well as the attributes of weaponized files or websites and compromised systems. Rather than detecting an exploit, they detect websites, URLs, URIs, and files which match attributes of weapon delivery, weaponization, and command and control (C2). This model produces the highest fidelity detection on exploitation behaviors, preceded by informational alerts but also generates a high volume of alerts which must be correlated for their potential to be realized. Using these behavioral indicators will produce a significant volume of independently uninteresting alerts, however the combination of multiple alerts in sequence enables the high fidelity “detection” rather than any single signature by itself. For example:

·         ET CURRENT_EVENTS Blackhole – Blackhole Java Exploit request to spn.jar (Java asked for a file)
·         ET INFO JAVA – Java Archive Download (A .jar was downloaded)
·         ET INFO Java .jar request to dotted-quad domain (Java requested a .jar to an unusual domain)
·         ET INFO EXE – Served Attached HTTP (an EXE was attached to an HTTP request)
·         ET CURRENT_EVENTS DRIVEBY Blackhole – Payload Download – readme.exe (readme.exe was downloaded)
·         ET POLICY Windows 98 User-Agent Detected – Possible Malware or Non-Updated System (an Internet application using an outdated identification string was detected)

These are all behavioral indicators of exploit kit activity. Specifically these examples are used in conjunction to detect the various stages of the Blackhole kit, however these attributes exist among numerous kits. In this example, some of these indicators are benign but when represented together in context, they provide a positive detection.

Missing the Message

Coincidentally I have heard countless arguments from security minded people who claim these highly pervasive exploit kits aren’t worth the resources to detect and defend against because they represent basic criminal activity. They argue that the real threat, the “Advanced Persistent Threat,” is where we should be focusing resources because they cause major damage. The basis for this argument assumes the delivery method used by the adversary is a direct representation of their level of sophistication which is a direct sign of their intent and ability. As operation ShadyRAT, Night Dragon, and now Red October have shown, this is a dangerous assumption. We see time and time again extremely sophisticated adversaries using common methodologies because that’s all it takes to infiltrate an organization. Why use your most sophisticated tactics and risk exposing them, when common tactics will suffice?

Advanced Threats

The Red October campaign with Flame-like characteristics uncovered by Kaspersky this week has been hitting the news rounds. More information is coming out daily and today it was revealed that the two primary delivery vectors were spear-phishing with a weaponized file (MS Word, Adobe PDF, or MS Excel) and web exploit via Java. Nothing new there, however it’s interesting to note the similarities with common web exploit kits (Blackhole, Redkit etc) which tend to get downplayed as common threats not worthy of the same attention as “APT” activity. This is a good reminder that the severity of the threat and who’s behind it is less about delivery and compromise symptoms and more about use. It’s not how it was delivered, it’s how it’s being used.


Notice this excerpt about delivery from the article referenced above: “the attackers sent an email with an embedded link to a specially crafted PHP web page. This webpage exploited a vulnerability in Java (CVE-2011-3544), and in the background downloaded and executed the malware automatically.” Later it appears the malware authors changed from PHP to CGI but continued to use web exploits. This maps exactly to the exploit kit methodology previously described.

That specific exploit and method was also used by Blackhole during early 2012 (the methodology is still active it just uses different exploits). Something organizations might downplay as Internet noise, hence the reason malware analysis is so critical; understanding what the malware is and does is essential to understanding the nature and severity of the threat and other reminder that web-based monitoring and behavioral detection remains a critical component of comprehensive defense.

Then there’s this: “Analysis of the server side source code of the exploit showed that the malware payload URL is encoded before being passed to the Java applet. ‘When the client is exploited, the URL gets decoded and the malware gets downloaded.’” That’s something else we’ve seen among common web exploit kits and the reason IDS often misses the exploit code and “attack” stage. The delivery is obfuscated and the exploit exposed post-delivery (rendered in the browser).

Conclusions

The combined research above has shown that market leading Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS, IPS) are woefully unprepared to not only address highly pervasive threats but also sophisticated nation-state sponsored campaigns which have persisted undetected for years. To detect and defend against the modern threat, whether they be common criminals or Advanced Persistent Threats, a comprehensive approach that covers all delivery vectors and focuses on behavior rather than exploit code is needed. Community based groups such as EmergingThreats.org and the various private threat intelligence sharing groups are a critical inclusion into active defense. Going stock IDS alone won’t solve this problem. A combination of able technology, people and process including understanding the nature of the threat; conducting ongoing research and analysis into adversary tools, tactics, and techniques  identifying behavioral indicators and developing signatures; community sharing; and data correlation is needed.

References
http://www.emergingthreats.net/open-source/open-source-overview/

Online Banking and Purchases

Introduction

This is a topic I get asked about often; "is it safe to bank online?" Closely related is the question, "is it safe to buy things online?" As with everything done on the Internet, there is risk involved. By using the Internet you are opening new possibilities for theft and exploitation. Personal safety is really an individual assessment based on your threshold for risk and the potential impact. The more you have to lose, the greater the risk, and we all have more to lose than we think. But risk can be mitigated to a point which may make you comfortable with moving forward. Risk also requires a threat before it can be realized.

The threat is absolutely there. The threat is bigger, more sophisticated, and more active than you realize. The threat is the same for everyone and yes, you are being targeted whether for direct theft or to be used as an intermediary.

But is it safe? It can be "safe enough" but again that's really a personal assessment which must be made after understanding the threat, the risk, and mitigation options.

Personally, I do bank online and I do make online purchases, however I am very careful and take active measures to protect myself and my accounts as much as possible. That includes being selective with whom I will make online financial transactions with. There are many whom I will not transact with. Let's take a look at a few.


Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

The information that forms your identity or can be used to validate your identity is termed PII by industry. This can include social security numbers, date-of-birth, place-of-birth, address, mother's maiden name etc. Basically anything you use to validate who you are with your bank over the phone. Information that is unique to you. This data is used to prove who you are when opening or creating accounts (banks, credit cards, loans) as well as associate you with medical records or any information which is considered private by industry. Safeguard this information. If with this information you can make financial transactions like opening lines of credit or accessing your bank accounts, then someone else can do the same on your behalf if they have this information. Don't ever transmit or post PII over the Internet unless it's secure and never post PII to a social media website including information you use for your security questions.

Examples of the Threat

There was a recent criminal ring in Long Beach, CA that was cracked and the ring leader (a 15 year old) put behind bars. The fraud ring used common information about customers to access their online accounts. They figured out that to reset a user's password for their online accounts of say Amazon, PayPal, Netflix, and others all you need is your name, billing address, and last four numbers of your social security or credit card on file. Then once they had a new password for the account, they could login legitimately and do whatever they want; copy down full credit cards, order services etc. When they didn't have the last 4 credit card numbers, the ring leader figured out a new trick. He would collect information about a person (name, address, maiden name, security question, personal information like dog's name etc.), then would call the customer support line of a telecommunications provider (say Cox, Time Warner etc.) saying they were a technician dispatched to a customer's home, then they would rattle off the information making it sound like they were there. The tech person on the phone would believe it and offer them more account information or reset the user's password for him. He'd hang up, then login with the temporary credentials to access the account and siphon information like credit card numbers which he'd use to access more accounts.

http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/09/cosmo-the-god-who-fell-to-earth/all/

The Zeus banking trojan is one of the most prolific pieces of malware out there today. Recent updates have shown thousands of websites have been used to serve Zeus and infect visitors. Hundreds of financial institutions have been affected, and European bank regulators have adopted the assumption that every PC connected to the Internet has been infected with Zeus. Zeus is nasty because it infects your computer silently through your web browser, then monitors your online activity to steal financial information and your passwords used to access online accounts.

http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/zeus/

Data In Transit

Everything we interact with on the Internet is logged. The data we send, the links and images with click on. The URLs we enter, the searches we make, every tweet, like, comment, message etc. is logged. Running a trace between me and Google (which hosts this blog) reveals there are minimally 15 network routing devices (more likely dozens of silent devices) which handle this session. They are logging, scanning, and inspecting this data while it's in transit. There are unknown copies of this data and session being stored for unknown reasons. Google uses SSL to encrypt my session which means only they can decrypt this data when they receive it. However, if they didn't use encryption, then everything I type would be visible to them. Data while in transit is usually unencrypted which means it is visible to everyone between you and the destination. There are ever increasing government regulations which are attempting to mandate and enforce encryption of sensitive personal information while in transit, but compliance is sketchy.

Data At Rest

Once the data has arrived at it's destination, it is stored for an unknown period of time. Could be days, weeks, months, years, decades, or forever. You and I have no idea. We are forced to trust that those holding our data are securing it appropriately. Securing it includes physical as well as virtual access. Think of all the employees who have access to that data and the fact that it's transmitted online means it can be accessed online by good guys and bad guys. Again, government regulations are increasingly requiring vendors to secure data while it is at rest or in storage on their servers. Securing this data can include physical and virtual access controls, encryption, separation of data, summarization of data etc.

Opening Doors


If you don't have an online account, then the possibilities for abuse via the Internet are just about nil. Once you create that account, you've created a doorway and it's largely up to you to maintain the locks and make sure you traverse that doorway carefully. You've opened a door for exposure of your data while in transit and you've created a place where your data can be stored while at rest.

Your browser is another door between your computer, tablet, or smartphone and the Internet. That door way works two ways. Data and applications are transferred in both directions. For more information about browsers, see my 2012 post titled "Web Browsers." Never enter PII information into online forms that are not encrypted. In your web browser, look at the address bar and make sure it starts with https. That "s" is critical as it implies Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is being used to encrypted the data you transmit between your computer and the website.

Email is another door between you and the Internet. Never ever under any circumstance email PII information unless it is secured. Even if you are in the process of refinancing your home as was recently the case for me. Don't fill out those forms, scan them, then email them to the lender. Email is not secure. There are numerous companies and intermediaries between you and the recipient who copy, log, and store that message. Besides, you have no idea if the other end has a secure computer or not. If you are emailing this information you are allowing the other person to store it on their computer. Entering form data into an online form or physically sending it is always a more secure option. Typically faxes are used by the other party to file away or to record the information in a database of some sort, then they are destroyed. Those databases are typically more secure than an individual's computer. Email is much more easily kept on the recipient's computer and not secured in a database or shredded after use. If you have WinZip or a similar program that can create a self-decrypting archive of the file that is password protected, then that's a viable option to transmit the data, but again you can't control what happens on the other end. Make sure you choose a password that is unique and not easy to guess in the context of your email (don't make it easy to guess) and request the person on the other side to delete the email once they have the information they need.

To help secure your data while at rest, it's best to not allow the merchant to save your credit card number or billing address. These features enable easy return visits and future purposes but also allow the merchant to store your information in their databases (at rest). It's another doorway.

Banking

The convenience of being able to transfer funds, view transactions, and pay bills from the comfort of your home makes online banking a serious draw. However, before you start or even if you already have, there are some steps you should take to limit your risk.

1. Use your own computer only

Never use a computer other than a device you own and if you are using an Android based mobile device, it's probably a good idea to avoid online banking with it. You can't trust other computers and you can't trust the Android app store (that's a discussion for another post).

2. Don't bank from public WIFI

Avoid doing online banking from any public WIFI network or hotspot. Don't do it at Starbucks or while at the airport or anywhere the WIFI network is used by people you don't know. It's trivial for me to setup a listener on a WIFI network from my laptop and copy down everything transmitted, or even route all the WIFI connections through my laptop in a public area. If you are on the road and in a hotel, use a wired connection. These are much more difficult to spy on.

3. Use AntiVirus

Make sure you are running current AntiVirus software on your computer. This includes Windows and Apple OSX users. For more information on AV, see my 2012 posts on that subject. Banking malware abounds and is likely the single most common malware out there. It exists to monitor your online activities, while recording the data you enter (before it's transmitted), to capture passwords, credit card numbers, social security numbers etc., then to transmit this information to an awaiting criminal. Keeping active AV will help keep this malware off your computer.

4. Check the URL for Encryption

Make sure the bank website uses SSL. Check your web browser address bar and make sure the URL starts with "https." This will secure your data while in transit.

5. Use Multi-Factor Authentication

Make sure the bank uses some sort of multi-factor or two-way authentication. Many online financial institutions today use a security key or picture which you choose when creating your account and include multiple stages of authentication. This image is stored by the financial institution to validate they are who they say they are (an anti phishing/spoofing method). Once you enter your user name, you're presented with this unique word or graphic and prompted for a password. This helps you validate the site is what it claims to be so you can send data in confidence. This also helps to prevent automated password guessing tools which constantly scan the Internet attempting to guess your password to gain access to your account. Password cracking is trivial these days.

6. Username not Account Number

Avoid using your account number as your account username. Credit card companies often allow you to use either option - a name or account number to login. Try to use your username to limit exposure of your data.

7. Use a unique password

Use a unique password for your bank account. Never use this password for any other online accounts. If you have multiple banks, use unique passwords for each. I know it's a pain, but you'll be grateful if one of these accounts is compromised.

8. Don't save passwords

Don't let your browser cache or save your password or account name information. Browsers offer this feature to help ease the process of logging into websites, but this information is stored in your browser and trivial to access by a malware or rogue application. Don't do it.

9. Log off

Log off when you are done. Most banks today will use an time-out feature to log you out automatically when you are idle, but it's a good idea to do it proactively.

Purchases

Buying stuff online is great. You might find the best deals for stuff online plus the selections and convenience factor simply make online buying a must for most of us. Before you create that account though, there's a few things to do to mitigate the risks.

1. Secure data in transit

Make sure the merchant website uses SSL. Check your web browser address bar and make sure the URL starts with "https." That means the data you enter into your web browser will be encrypted when it is transmitted to the website. This prevents unintended leaking of data in transit.

2. Secure data at rest

Avoid allowing the vendor to save your credit card number. Again, while this may help to ease the process of performing future transactions, allowing the vendor to save your credit card number means your number is being stored somewhere.

3. Use a trusted system and network

Like online banking, avoid using public computers (Internet cafe's) or even a friend's computer to perform online purchases as well as public networks such as WIFI hot spots.

4. Secure your account

Use unique passwords for online vendor accounts. If you use a common password for multiple websites, minimally separate your financial accounts from your bank account and email accounts.

5. Use trusted vendors

Try to restrict your online purchases to major retailers and avoid sending your credit card information to online versions of mom-and-pop shops. I know this sounds like I'm promoting big business, but these big businesses have more resources to secure your data and typically fall under greater government regulations.

In Conclusion

As I mentioned in the introduction, performing financial transactions through the Internet presents significant risks. These risks can be mitigated to a degree which may make you feel comfortable. The fact is you will probably encounter and become a victim of fraud at some point, no matter how careful you are. I have had credit cards stolen twice. It simply is a symptom of the world we live in. The only way to mitigate this risk 100% would be to avoid the Internet altogether. Since that's likely not to happen, take care and you'll be relatively safe.